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The Structure of Expertise in Criminal Cases 
Christopher Slobogin∗ 
This Essay is built around three propositions about expert 
testimony and criminal cases.  First, Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.1 and its progeny, General Electric Co. v. Joiner,2 and 
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,3 push the criminal justice system away 
from the notion that knowledge is socially constructed and toward a 
positivist epistemology that assumes we can know things objectively.  
Second, in the long run, that development will be good for 
prosecutors and bad for criminal defendants.  Third, the 
consequence of that differential impact will be a criminal justice 
system that is not only less fair, but also less reliable.  In the course of 
developing these propositions, this Essay will have occasion to 
comment on several observations made by Denbeaux and Risinger,4 
the principal paper in this cluster of papers on Daubert, as well as on 
several other papers presented at this Symposium. 
THE POSITIVIST PUSH 
There is no doubt that, in theory, the Daubert trilogy moves the 
admissibility analysis in a positivist direction.  The trilogy establishes 
reliability as the linchpin of admissibility analysis.  In contrast, the 
best-known pre-Daubert approaches to expert admissibility are the 
relevance test, which admits expert testimony unless its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by its potential for confusing or 
overawing the jury, and the general acceptance test, which looks at 
the extent to which the basis of the testimony has found favor in the 
 
 ∗ Stephen C. O’Connell Professor of Law, University of Florida Fredric G. Levin 
College of Law.  I want to thank Mark Fondacaro and the participants at the 
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 1 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 2 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
 3 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
 4 Mark P. Denbeaux & D. Michael Risinger, Kumho Tire and Expert Reliability: How 
the Question You Ask Gives the Answer You Get, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 15 (2003). 
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relevant professional community.5  The Daubert trilogy mandates that 
testimony be subject to verification through the scientific method or 
some other transparent methodology,6 whereas the latter tests come 
close to relying solely on the ipse dixit of a single individual or group, 
so long as he, she, or it is well-credentialed.7 
As a result, the relevance and general acceptance tests are much 
more likely than the Daubert trilogy to give legal factfinders wide-
ranging, “socially-constructed” information.8  Under the relevance 
test, virtually all expertise is admissible, and under the general 
acceptance test, all expertise that is not “novel” should get in.  Under 
the reliability standard, on the other hand, only verifiable 
information is admissible.  The first two tests are likely to admit any 
expert testimony the reliability test would let in, with the possible 
exception of testimony based on new, verifiable findings (which 
might not be admissible under Frye but would be under the trilogy).  
In contrast, the reliability test is likely to exclude a substantial amount 
of expert testimony that is admissible under the relevance and 
general acceptance tests.9  That means that, under the Daubert trilogy, 
 
 5 See generally Paul Giannelli, Forensic Science: Daubert in the States, 34 CRIM. L. 
BULL. 154, 155-62 (1998). 
 6 Ronald J. Allen, Expertise and the Supreme Court: What Is the Problem?, 34 SETON 
HALL. L. REV. 1, 3 (2003) (stating that “verifiable reliability of evidence” is the 
“central concern” of the trilogy). 
 7 See Giannelli, supra note 5, at 155 (stating that under the relevancy test, “if the 
expert was qualified, the underlying technique used by that expert was also 
qualified”); Paul Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United 
States, A Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1207 (1980) (“The principal 
justification for the Frye test” is that it “‘assures that those most qualified to assess the 
general validity of a scientific method will have the determinative voice.’”) (quoting 
United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743-44 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).  Professor Giannelli 
also notes how the general acceptance test obscures inquiry into reliability and 
probative value issues.  Id. at 1226-28. 
 8 Some commentators have argued that Daubert is more consistent with a social 
constructionist view of science than the Frye test.  More specifically, they contend that 
while the general acceptance test (and therefore, implicitly, the relevance test) 
legitimizes “elite, authoritative opinions” as “the sole arbiters of specialized 
knowledge,” Daubert and Kumho Tire take a “realist-constructivist view of science.”  
Joseph Sanders et al., Legal Perceptions of Science and Expert Knowledge, 8 PSYCHOL., PUB. 
POL’Y & L. 139, 149-50 (2002).  The latter view, Sanders and his colleagues state, 
recognizes that expertise is influenced by political, economic and other non-neutral 
sources, albeit in a manner that is “constrained by input from the empirical world.”  
Id. at 150-51 (citing STEPHEN COLE, MAKING SCIENCE: BETWEEN NATURE AND SOCIETY x 
(1992)).  All that may be true, but it does not directly address Daubert’s impact in 
court.  In determining whether Daubert will make expertise more positivist in tone, 
the focus should be on what the legal factfinder is likely to hear, not on the source of 
the expert’s expertise.  For reasons outlined in the text, a reliability test clearly 
excludes more expert testimony than the other two tests. 
 9 As Denbeaux and Risinger state, “at least until what we might call the run-up 
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legal factfinders will be exposed to much less “soft” science and much 
less speculation based on experience.10  In short, the reliability 
standard should make the epistemology of the courtroom decidedly 
more scientific, in the classic sense. 
Of course, in criminal cases, the focus of this Essay, that 
prediction has not been entirely borne out.  Courts in Daubert 
jurisdictions still admit scientifically weak expert testimony proffered 
by both the prosecution and the defense.  As Professors Risinger and 
Denbeaux point out, suspect testimony from handwriting and 
fingerprint experts continues unabated in many jurisdictions,11 and 
other research indicates that the prosecution often benefits from soft 
testimony about subjects such as dangerousness and the behavior of 
child sex abuse victims.12  Defense experts may be somewhat more 
likely to be rejected post-Daubert,13 but many trial courts still routinely 
allow them to testify about syndromes and other unusual mental 
states that are only weakly supported by data.14 
 
period immediately preceding Daubert, judges were not compelled by doctrine and 
rarely undertook in practice to evaluate the asserted warrant to believe claims of 
expertise directly, in the terms put forth by the practitioners of the claimed 
expertise.”  Denbeaux & Risinger, supra note 4, at 24. 
 10 Professor Gottesman made this point in the converse, and somewhat 
hyperbolically, when he stated, “[t]he Court’s opinion [in Daubert] read literally 
would dictate the end of the receipt of psychiatric and psychological testimony in 
federal courts.”  Michael H. Gottesman, Symposium, Admissibility of Expert Testimony 
after Daubert: The “Prestige” Factor, 43 EMORY L.J. 867, 875-76 (1994). 
 11 Denbeaux & Risinger, supra note 4, at 64, 70. 
 12 Donald N. Bersoff et al., The Admissibility of Psychological Evidence Six Years After 
Daubert: Floodgates or Gatekeeping?, paper presented at the biennial meeting of the 
American Psychology-Law Society, New Orleans, La. (March 2000) (observing that 
the proportion of cases in Daubert jurisdictions admitting expert evidence about such 
subjects as mental disorders, syndromes, intent, dangerousness, and child sex abuse 
victims either remained the same or increased in the first five years after that 
decision as compared to the five years prior to Daubert). 
 13 See infra text accompanying notes 42-45 (describing rejection of expert 
testimony about confessions and eyewitnesses); Jennifer L. Groscup & Steven D. 
Penrod, Battle of the Standards for Experts in Criminal Cases: Police vs. Psychologists, 33 
SETON HALL L. REV. 1141, 1155 (2003)(in study of post-Daubert expert admissibility 
decisions, “prosecution experts were admitted significantly more often than defense 
proffered experts”). 
 14 See generally Bersoff, supra note 12.  See also, S.A. Dobbin et al., Battered Woman 
Syndrome and Rape Trauma Syndrome: A Case Law Analysis After Daubert, paper 
presented at the annual meeting of the American Psychology-Law Society, Redondo 
Beach, Cal. (March 1998) (stating that courts determining the admissibility of 
battered women and rape trauma syndrome evidence after 1993 “are not generally 
engaging in scientific reviews of the proffered syndrome . . . . Most typically, the 
focus is on general acceptance and the qualifications of the expert, and even then 
the judicial review tends to be cursory.”) (on file with author); Ralph Slovenko, From 
Frye to Daubert and Beyond, 28 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 411, 436 (2000)(“since Daubert 
[behavioral and social science] evidence that would have been admitted prior to 
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At the same time, the clear trend is toward more exclusion.  In 
his contribution to this Symposium, Paul Gianelli notes that the 
Daubert trilogy has triggered attacks, some of them successful, on 
handwriting evidence, hair comparisons, fingerprint examinations, 
firearms identification, bite marks, and intoxication testing.15  An 
empirical study of criminal cases that was concluded in 1998 found 
that, although there was only a marginally significant decline in the 
proportion of expert evidence admitted, judges were clearly 
scrutinizing such evidence more closely after Daubert.16  It is likely that 
momentum in this direction will increase, now that Kumho Tire has 
closed the “technical and specialized knowledge” loophole by 
applying the reliability standard to that type of expertise as well as to 
scientific testimony.17 
DAUBERT’S DISADVANTAGES FOR THE DEFENSE 
Proponents of Daubert think that the trend toward screening is 
all to the good and would like to see it accelerated.  I am much more 
ambivalent on this score, at least when considering criminal cases.  
To explain why, I first want to establish the second proposition 
mentioned above—that the move toward the scientific way of seeing 
the world is much better for prosecutors than for criminal 
defendants. 
The preliminary reaction to this point is likely to be that it gets 
things backward.  Denbeaux and Risinger amply illustrate that 
prosecutors stand to lose a significant amount of expert support if 
Daubert is applied rigorously to testimony about handwriting, 
fingerprints, and the like.18  Defense attorneys would also find many 
of their experts excluded or limited under a strict Daubert regime, but 
most might be willing to put up with that development if the 
prosecution were prevented from presenting suspect forensic 
 
Daubert has been excluded only in isolated cases, [and] overall Daubert has not 
resulted in changes in the admissibility of that kind of evidence.”). 
 15 Paul C. Giannelli, The Supreme Court’s “Criminal” Daubert Cases, 33 SETON HALL 
L. REV. 1071, 1096-97 (2003). 
 16 Jennifer L. Groscup et al., The Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility of Expert 
Testimony in State and Federal Criminal Cases, 8 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 339 (2002). 
 17 526 U.S. at 150-51; cf. Lloyd Dixon & Brian Gill, Changes in the Standards for 
Admitting Expert Evidence in Federal Civil Cases Since the Daubert Decision, 8 PSYCHOL., 
PUB. POL’Y & L. 251, 269, 277 (2002) (finding that post-Daubert, “judges have 
examined the reliability of expert evidence more closely and have found more 
evidence unreliable as a result” and that “Kumho appears to have confirmed a trend 
already under way in federal district courts to apply Daubert broadly rather than 
restrict it to hard science”). 
 18 Denbeaux & Risinger, supra note 4, at 60-74. 
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evidence. 
In the long run, however, the likelihood is high that criminal 
defendants will suffer much more than the state if Daubert is taken 
seriously.  That is because prosecutors and defense attorneys need 
different types of experts to make their cases-in-chief.  The 
prosecution uses experts primarily to support assertions about 
physical facts.  It most often needs opinion evidence to prove identity, 
as in testimony that ties a fingerprint, a strand of hair, or a signature 
to the defendant, or a bullet to a particular gun.  Occasionally, it also 
uses experts to prove that a physical act occurred, such as abuse,19 or 
will occur, as in dangerousness determinations.20 
In contrast, the defense’s affirmative case is most likely to involve 
claims about the defendant’s mental state at the time of the offense, 
such as insanity, lack of premeditation, extreme mental or emotional 
stress, or learned helplessness.  While the prosecution sometimes 
bears the burden of proving mental states,21 the defense always bears 
the burden of production on these issues.22  That is because most 
factfinders assume, based on “common sense” notions that are often 
legally recognized,23 that criminal defendants are sane, intend their 
actions, and act in self-defense or under duress only when objective 
circumstances would force a reasonable person to do so.  The 
prosecution only needs experts on mental state issues if and when the 
 
 19 See generally, Robert P. Mosteller, Syndromes and Politics in Criminal Trials and 
Evidence Law, 46 DUKE L.J. 461, 470 (1996) (describing prosecutor use of child sexual 
abuse accommodation syndrome, which describes psychological characteristics and 
conduct sometimes associated with abuse, and battered child syndrome, which 
describes physical characteristics highly correlated with abuse). 
 20 See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (upholding, against 
constitutional challenges, the admissibility of psychiatric testimony on dangerousness 
in a capital sentencing proceeding). 
 21 In approximately one-third of the states the prosecution bears the burden of 
disproving insanity, with the rest requiring the defendant to prove insanity by a 
preponderance of the evidence or clear and convincing evidence.  RALPH REISNER ET 
AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS 527-28 (3d ed. 
1999).  The prosecution often bears the burden of proving mens rea and disproving 
self-defense claims, but not always.  WAYNE LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 54-59 (3d. ed. 
2000) (discussing this complicated area and concluding that, to a large extent, “it 
remains for each jurisdiction to decide how to allocate the burden of proof in 
criminal cases as to so-called affirmative defenses”). 
 22 LAFAVE, supra note 21, at 54 (“[I]t is uniformly held that the defendant is 
obliged to start matters off by putting in some evidence in support of his defense—
e.g., evidence of his insanity, or of his acting in self-defense, or of one of the other 
affirmative defenses . . . .”). 
 23 Id. at 239-41 (stating that every jurisdiction recognizes a presumption of sanity 
and juries are allowed to draw an inference that people intend the consequences of 
their actions); id. at 375 (describing when “permissive inference” instructions 
regarding mental state are constitutional). 
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defense decides to use a mental health professional.24  Thus, it is up 
to the defense to put mental health experts into play. 
This difference in the type of experts the prosecution and 
defense need for their prima facie cases becomes extremely 
significant in a strict Daubert regime.  That is because assertions about 
physical facts are eminently more verifiable than assertions about past 
mental state.  As Denbeaux and Risinger demonstrate, testing the 
hypothesis that a single fingerprint is enough to provide a match or 
that a particular handwriting expert is proficient at identification is 
relatively easy as science goes.25  The same cannot be said for research 
on past mental state. 
I have developed at length elsewhere why this is so.26  In brief, 
the point is that mental states such as insanity, lack of premeditation, 
extreme mental and emotional stress, and reasonable fear of harm 
are closer to social constructions than objective facts.  While a 
scientist or technician can, at least in theory, tell us the extent to 
which fingerprints match, only juries can tell us whether a defendant 
premeditated, appreciated the wrongfulness of his or her actions, or 
 
 24 The prosecution does occasionally use experts to prove past mental state in 
drug and possession cases.  See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 192 F.3d 580, 589 (1999) 
(“‘Courts have overwhelmingly found police officers’ expert testimony admissible 
where it will aid the jury’s understanding of an area, such as drug dealing, not within 
the experience of the average juror.’”) (quoting United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 
676, 682 (6th Cir. 1996)).  The experts are usually police, not mental health 
professionals, and the assertions made (e.g., that a person with a rolled up pants-leg 
is a drug dealer) are generally much more susceptible to verification than the 
assertions made by defense experts testifying about insanity and other defensive 
doctrines.  See Mark Hansen, Dr. Cop on the Stand, A.B.A. J., May 2002, at 31-32. 
 25 Denbeaux & Risinger, supra note 4, at 60-64, 68-70; see also, David A. Stoney, 
Fingerprint Identification: Scientific Status, in 3 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., THE LAW AND 
SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 394-95 (2002) (describing “realistic” methodological 
models for measuring fingerprint identification expertise that are not “particularly 
easy” but are “feasible” and will provide information about the reliability of 
identification “when there is some minimal level of detail present in the 
fingerprints”).  The same can be said for other forensic techniques on which the 
government relies.  See, e.g., Alfred Biasotti & John Murdock, Firearms and Toolmark 
Identification, in 3 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra, at 517 (“It is anticipated that objective 
quantitative criteria for identification will eventually become widely accepted and 
used because of the research already conducted and published . . . .”); Michael P. 
Risinger, Handwriting Identification: Scientific Status, in 3 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra, at 481 
(“Research can provide a warrant for believing that document examiners possess 
sufficient skills in regard to particular tasks to warrant admission, at least under test 
conditions.”). 
 26 See Christopher Slobogin, Doubts About Daubert: Psychiatric Anecdata as a Case 
Study, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 919, 927-31 (2000) [hereinafter Slobogin, Doubts About 
Daubert]; Christopher Slobogin, Psychiatric Evidence in Criminal Trials: To Junk or Not 
to Junk?, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 35-40 (1998) [hereinafter Slobogin, Psychiatric 
Evidence in Criminal Trials]. 
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experienced irresistible urges or overwhelming fears.27  Further, even 
if such constructions are somehow reducible to objective referents, 
“scientific” measurement of their existence at the time of a criminal 
offense is very difficult; the stability of intent, the depth of 
appreciation, and the strength of urges and fears are not susceptible 
to easy calibration even in the present, much less the past.28  Thomas 
Grisso, who has spent most of his highly regarded career developing 
and researching instruments designed to assess forensic psychological 
issues, summarizes the two points just made as follows: “There is little 
reason to believe that past meager advances in performing 
evaluations for criminal responsibility will be augmented in the near 
future,” both because the relevant “theoretical and operational 
definitions are difficult to identify” and because “we have not yet 
demonstrated our ability even to make . . . basic retrospective 
inferences [about mental disorder at the time of the offense] reliably 
and validly . . . .”29  In a strict Daubert regime, the typical defense 
expert may be able to do little more than describe a criminal 
defendant’s alleged thoughts and actions, and leave further 
inferences to the factfinder.30 
A second, more subtle difference between prosecution and 
defense expertise is that, on those occasions when verifiability is 
possible, the latter type of expertise is more prone to lack “fit.”  
Daubert and Kumho Tire have made the fit inquiry a fundamental 
 
 27 A behavioral scientist friend of mine who insists that we can study past mental 
state scientifically put the point this way: past mental states “are hypothetical 
constructs based on inferences drawn from multiple observed sources, sometimes of 
tenuous relationship to the underlying construct, [rather than] a single observation 
of a concrete, observable fact with an inevitable but often very small error rate 
associated with the accuracy or validity of the observation.”  Mark Fondacaro, 
comments to author, January 14, 2003.  Whether my take or his is more accurate, 
both expose the difference between defense (past mental state) and prosecution 
(physical fact) expertise. 
 28 See Alexander Rosenberg, The Explanation of Human Action, in PHILOSOPHY OF 
SOCIAL SCIENCE 47-49 (1988) (describing why measuring “what a person believes by 
some distinct effect of the belief, in the way that a thermometer measures heat by its 
quite distinct effect . . . is impossible”). 
 29 Thomas Grisso, Pretrial Clinical Evaluations in Criminal Cases: Past Trends and 
Future Directions, 23 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 90, 97-98 (1996). 
 30 Stephen Morse argues that this is all mental health professionals should be 
allowed to say in court, because further inferences are unreliable and trench on the 
legal factfinder’s job of making normative decisions.  Stephen J. Morse, Crazy 
Behavior, Morals and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527, 
600-19 (1978).  Professor Bonnie and I took issue with this position, see Richard J. 
Bonnie & Christopher Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health Professionals in the Criminal 
Process: The Case for Informed Speculation, 66 VA. L. REV. 427 (1980), for reasons that 
later parts of this Essay suggest and elaborate upon.  See infra text accompanying 
notes 55 to 77. 
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aspect of admissibility analysis.31  The key issue here, as Denbeaux and 
Risinger indicate, is “the reliability of the proffered expertise 
specifically as it applies to the task for which it is being utilized in the 
litigation in which it is offered, not in some more global sense.”32  
This reliability-for-a-specific-purpose test is likely to exclude more 
defense expertise than prosecution expertise because, given the 
greater ease with which they can be found in the real world or 
simulated in the laboratory, physical facts can be investigated with 
much more specificity than the usual types of claims defendants 
make. 
For instance, if investigators want to determine the accuracy of 
fingerprint identification when there are only two partial prints or 
only three match points, they can simply replicate those situations 
using known individuals, in as many variations as they desire, and 
ascertain the experts’ ability to match the prints with the full prints of 
the sample.  The same sort of procedure can be undertaken with 
handwriting, ballistics and DNA analysis.  In scientific terms, the 
research can be carried out with objective criterion variables having 
high external validity. 
Scenarios useful to criminal defense experts, by contrast, are 
much more difficult to arrange in the lab.  This is most evident with 
respect to mental states during criminal events.  For obvious ethical 
and legal reasons, these mental states cannot be reproduced 
experimentally.  More fundamentally, even if they could be, or are 
discovered through ex post interviewing, these states are so varied in 
content and process that obtaining “scientific” data about them that 
are generalizable to legal proceedings is close to futile.  As Daniel 
Fishman notes about psychological states generally, 
[i]n the individual case, be it the possibility of suicide, the 
determination of which parent is better qualified in a custody 
hearing, or the assessment of whether a criminal defendant is 
innocent by reason of insanity, context and complexity dictate 
against operationalizing a discrete outcome or collecting base 
rates on similar types of situations.33 
 
 31 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591 (“‘Fit’ is not always obvious, and scientific validity 
for one purpose is not necessarily scientific validity for other, unrelated purposes.”); 
id. at 597 (stating that the Federal Rules of Evidence “assign to the trial judge the 
task of ensuring that an expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is 
relevant to the task at hand”); see also Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 156 (“The trial court 
ha[s] to decide whether this particular expert had sufficient specialized knowledge 
to assist the jurors ‘in deciding the particular issues in the case.’”). 
 32 Denbeaux & Risinger, supra note 4, at 30. 
 33 DANIEL B. FISHMAN, THE CASE FOR PRAGMATIC PSYCHOLOGY 210 (1999).  Putting 
this point another way, on those occasions when we can get “scientific” information 
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The other two types of defense expertise mentioned above—
false confession and eyewitness testimony—can be almost as difficult 
to bolster with task-specific research.  Consider first false confessions.  
Ideal research either would simulate the types of police techniques 
hypothesized to cause such confessions (analogue research), or 
would locate people who have confessed to a crime they did not 
commit and then try to trace the factors that led to the confession 
(validation research).  Analogue research would have the most 
potent external validity if it involved police use of  various 
interrogation techniques, such as prolonged questioning, promises of 
leniency, and deception about the strength of the evidence, in 
situations where it was known the suspect did not commit the act 
police want him to admit.  But practical and ethical problems with 
this type of research abound (e.g., making the interrogation “real” 
for both police and suspects; concerns about subjecting innocent 
individuals to coercion and deception).  An alternative analogue 
study might involve accusing subjects of something noncriminal and 
subjecting them to lesser pressures; if false confessions occurred 
under such circumstances, one might be able to draw conclusions 
about the effects of police techniques.  But the prosecution would 
rightly point to the fact that the consequences of a false admission in 
such noncriminal contexts do not approximate imprisonment and 
thus make such admissions easier.34 
Validation research—i.e., finding people who have confessed 
falsely and then classifying possible causal variables—is even more 
difficult, because of the low base rate of false confessions35 and the 
 
about past mental states, it is close to useless in an individual case.  See, e.g., Slobogin, 
Doubts About Daubert, supra note 26, at 928-31 & n.51.  That does not mean we 
cannot improve, in a systematic way, the evaluation of past mental states.  See 
FISHMAN, supra; Slobogin, infra note 66. 
 34 The only study of this type, conducted in 1996, involved seventy-five college 
students who were given a typing test on a computer and told not to touch the “ALT” 
key because it would crash the computer program and ruin the experiment.  One 
minute into the test the computer program crashed; although the crash was caused 
by the experimenters, the subject was blamed.  Using several modern interrogation 
techniques, the research team was able to get 69% of the subjects to falsely confess to 
causing the crash.  But as Professor Kassin, the principal investigator, recognized, far 
higher stakes are involved in a criminal investigation and, perhaps more importantly, 
the facts were such that the subjects could have honestly believed they caused the 
crash, as evidenced by the fact that over a third of the confessors stated they were 
responsible after simply being asked “What happened?”  Saul M. Kassin & Katherine 
L. Kiechel, The Social Psychology of False Confessions: Compliance, Internalization, and 
Confabulation, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. 125 (1996). 
 35 Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent from False Confessions and Lost ConfessionsB 
And from Miranda, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 497, 502 (1998) (estimating the 
base rate for false confessions at between 1 in 2400 and 1 in 90,000). 
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difficulty of determining when confessions are in fact false.36  Most 
importantly for present purposes, even if it can be carried out, 
neither it nor analogue research is likely to produce results that easily 
fit a proposition in criminal adjudication.  Rather, the findings are 
likely to read something like, “The longer the interrogation, the 
more likely a false confession will occur,” or “People who are 
diagnosed as submissive based on personality testing are more likely 
to give in to suggestions.”37 
Simulation of eyewitness situations is somewhat easier.  
Researchers can subject experimental eyewitnesses to crime-relevant 
scenarios, varying the race of the perpetrator, the presence of a 
weapon, the length of the encounter, lighting and distance, and a 
host of factors having to do with the nature of the identification 
procedure (lineups, photo arrays, etc.).  They can then gauge the 
ability of the subjects to describe and identify the actual 
perpetrators.38  For this reason, study of eyewitness accuracy tends to 
be among the most reliable research, as far as it goes.39  But in the 
end, it does not go very far.  Similar to false confession research, all 
that eyewitness research is likely to tell us is something comparative, 
to wit: “All else being equal, an eyewitness who is confronted with a 
gun is less likely to be accurate in identifying the perpetrator than 
someone who was not confronted by a weapon.”40 
It should not be surprising that courts have tended to exclude 
this type of testimony.41  Sometimes the exclusion is explicitly on 
unreliability grounds,42 but more commonly, consistent with the 
foregoing comments, it results from a judicial determination that the 
 
 36 Compare Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: 
Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1998) (claiming to have found sixty cases of false 
confessions) with Cassell, supra note 35, at 587 (claiming that nine out of the twenty-
nine cases reported by Leo and Ofshe that Cassell examined did not involve false 
confessions). 
 37 See Welsh S. White, What Is an Involuntary Confession Now?, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 
2001 (1998) (summarizing the research in these terms). 
 38 See generally Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identification: Scientific Status, in 2 FAIGMAN 
ET AL., supra note 25, at 391-422. 
 39 See Steven D. Penrod et al., Expert Psychological Testimony on Eyewitness Reliability 
Before and After Daubert: The State of the Law and the Science, 13 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 229, 256 
(1995) (concluding that eyewitness research meets the Daubert criteria). 
 40 See, e.g., Wells, supra note 38, at 404-07. 
 41 See Janet C. Hoeffel, The Sixth Amendment’s Lost Clause: Unearthing Compulsory 
Process, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1275, 1325-43 (summarizing the courts’ hostility to 
eyewitness and confession testimony). 
 42 See, e.g., United States v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870 (8th Cir. 1996) (eyewitness 
testimony); United States v. Brien, 59 F.3d 274 (1st Cir. 1995) (eyewitness testimony); 
State v. MacDonald, 718 A.2d 195, 198 (Me. 1998) (false confessions). 
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evidence is not helpful to the trier of fact because, given its general 
nature, it is within the ken of the jury and will not help resolve the 
particular issues in the case.43  The study of appellate court decisions 
reported by Jennifer Groscup and Stephen Penrod in this Symposium 
verifies this conclusion.  It found that the type of behavioral science 
expert most likely to be excluded by the courts was the experimental 
psychologist (precisely the type of expert who testifies about 
eyewitness and confession issues) and that the usual reason given for 
the exclusion was the testimony’s failure to “assist” the factfinder.44  
These types of holdings, whether correct or not,45 will only increase if 
courts dogmatically adhere to the Daubert trilogy’s focus on fit; trial 
judges can tell themselves that, while the expert’s research is 
interesting, it does very little to resolve whether this confession or this 
eyewitness identification is false. 
Another way to make these points, in Daubertian language, is to 
say that useful error rates will be harder to ascertain for defense 
expertise than for prosecution expertise.  Error rate is one of the four 
 
 43 The following two cases are representative.  With respect to false confession 
research, consider State v. Free, 798 A.2d 83 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002).  “[S]ince 
Dr. Kassin cannot identify the degree to which the presence of one or more of these 
factors might cause a false confession, his opinions . . . would be of no assistance to 
the jury.  What the jury would be left with . . . was accurately categorized by the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine as ‘nothing more than an assertion that false 
confessions do occur.’”.  Id. at 96.  With respect to eyewitness testimony, consider 
United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095 (7th Cir. 1999).  “‘[E]xpert testimony regarding 
the potential hazards of eyewitness identification—regardless of its reliability—will 
not aid the jury because it addresses an issue of which the jury already generally is 
aware, and it will not contribute to their understanding of the particular factual 
issues posed.’”  Id. at 1105 (quoting United States v. Larkin, 978 F.2d 964, 971 (7th 
Cir. 1992). 
 44 Groscup & Penrod, supra note 13, at 1153 (reporting a survey of appellate 
cases finding that testimony from experimental psychologists was admitted in only 
22.1% of the cases—compared to a 49.7% admission rate for clinical psychologists 
and an 85.7% rate for police—and that the courts’ rationale for exclusion was usually 
not unreliability but a conclusion that the “experimental psychologists did not assist 
the trier of fact.”). 
 45 I think they are incorrect, because the testimony educates the jury in helpful 
ways, a fact which some courts recognize.  See, e.g., United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d 
321, 340 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[The eyewitness expert] attempted to provide information 
that, if itself deemed credible, might cause the jury to evaluate [the eyewitness’s] 
testimony in a different light.”); Miller v. State, 770 N.E.2d 763, 774 (Ind. 2002) 
(“[False confession] testimony would have assisted the jury regarding the psychology 
of relevant aspects of police interrogation and the interrogation of mentally retarded 
persons, topics outside common knowledge and experience.”).  See generally D. 
Michael Risinger, Preliminary Thoughts on a Functional Taxonomy of Expertise for the Post-
Kumho World, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 508, 515-26 (2000) (describing 
“summarizational” and “translational” expertise which educates the jury about 
general scientific and technical knowledge). 
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factors identified in Daubert as indicia of reliability,46 and perhaps the 
most important.  Forensic labs can produce error rates for all sorts of 
scenarios, for the reasons indicated earlier.  In contrast, 
particularized error rates are much harder to generate in connection 
with social science research because of the multiplicity of potential 
variables that might explain criminal behavior or its perception.  
Even with respect to eyewitness testimony, which is based on the most 
sophisticated social science research canvassed here, useful error 
rates are hard to come by.  As Gary Wells, a prominent researcher in 
this area has noted, 
Unfortunately . . . effect size measures from [eyewitness] 
experiments are not necessarily applicable to actual cases (even 
when measured as standard deviation units), because experiments 
tend to hold constant and ensure the independence of other 
variables that could influence eyewitness accuracy.  The result of 
this is that most eyewitness experts are reluctant to make firm 
statements regarding effect sizes.47 
And when experts demonstrate this reluctance, courts influenced by 
fit considerations have been quite willing to find it grounds for 
exclusion.48 
The dichotomy between prosecution and defense expertise 
would be even greater under one interpretation of Daubert.  Suppose 
research shows that forensic investigators with a two-point match can 
make a correct fingerprint identification only 20% of the time; in 
other words, there is an 80% error rate in such situations.  One can 
make a good argument that, under Daubert, even this relatively high 
error rate should not be a bar to admission, because the error rate 
can be communicated to the jury, and the jury can act accordingly.49  
Only the failure to have the error rate handy would lead to exclusion.  
The defense is much more likely to fail in this regard because of the 
aforementioned methodological difficulties. 
This latter comment suggests the final way Daubert hurts the 
defense more than the prosecution.  Research requires money.  The 
 
 46 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594. 
 47 Wells, supra note 38, at 415. 
 48 See, e.g., State v. McClendon, 730 A.2d 1107, 1115 (Conn. 1999) (“Leippe did 
refer to several areas of scientific inquiry concerning eyewitness identification, but . . 
. admitted, in sum, that ‘we don’t always know what factors are influencing’ an 
eyewitness.  He conceded that a controversy existed in the area of the statistical 
probability of false identification, the one kind of information inaccessible to the 
average juror.”). 
 49 Michael Saks made this argument at this Symposium.  Cf. Michael J. Saks, The 
Legal and Scientific Evaluation of Forensic Science (Especially Fingerprint Expert Testimony), 
33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1167, 1169-70 (2003). 
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state has more of it.  Of course, the defense is always resource-
disadvantaged when it comes to expert testimony.  But Daubert 
exacerbates that disadvantage by putting a premium on verifiability, 
rather than allowing anyone with credentials to testify. 
The state not only has more money, but it is better equipped, in 
an institutional sense, to use it.  Prosecutors are much better at 
sharing information than defense attorneys.  That is partly because 
the government is by its nature a more coherent entity than the 
defense bar, but it is also because the state is better able to anticipate 
the scientific issues that will arise and act accordingly.  Indeed, 
Daubert and Kumho Tire have already stimulated massive federal efforts 
to validate the type of forensic expertise typically relied upon by the 
prosecution.50  There is no analogous criminal defense effort to 
generate scientific research on past mental states, false confessions, 
and eyewitnesses and, given the atomistic nature of defense work, 
unlikely to be any.  Further, any one attorney’s attempt to obtain 
research for a particular case is likely to meet a hostile reception from 
the courts, because it is so obviously motivated by litigation needs.51 
Professor Park notes that academic researchers have often come 
to the aid of defense attorneys, and implies that they can 
counterbalance the government’s advantage.52  But their resources 
pale when compared to the government’s.53  More importantly for the 
 
 50 For example, in 2001, Congress appropriated over $12 million to the FBI for 
scientific research on projects such as identification of latent fingerprints and 
gunshot residue, and overall provided “the means to initiate over 47 new, 
high-priority research and development projects, for a total of 93 active projects in 
2002.”  Steven T. Homeyer, The FBI Research Partnership Program, 5 FORENSIC SCI. 
COMM. (Jan. 2003), at http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/fsc/backissu/jan2003/homeyer. 
htm (last visited Aug. 21, 2003).  For 2002, the relevant congressional committee 
recommended another $8 million over 2001’s appropriation (for a total of over $20 
million).  Id.  There are at least ten government-sponsored “scientific working 
groups” in areas such as DNA analysis, bloodstain pattern analysis, firearms and tool 
marks identification, and drug analysis.  Carol Henderson, presentation at panel on 
Science after Kumho Tire: When is Science Really Science?, A.A.L.S. Meeting, Wash., D.C. 
(Jan. 3, 2003) (on file with author). 
 51 The advisory committee notes to the revised Federal Rule of Evidence 702 
indicate that courts often consider as a reliability-indicating factor the “nonjudicial 
uses” to which the basis of expert testimony has been put, suggesting that if there are 
no non-judicial uses, reliability is suspect.  See also, Judge Kozinski’s opinion in 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995) (“One very 
significant fact to be considered is whether the experts are proposing to testify about 
matters growing naturally and directly out of research they have conducted 
independent of the litigation, or whether they have developed their opinions 
expressly for purposes of testifying.”). 
 52 Roger C. Park, Daubert on a Tilted Playing Field, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1113 
(2003). 
 53 Between 1989 and 2002, the National Science Foundation dispensed roughly 
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thesis of this Essay, their alliance with the defense might not survive 
more rigorous application of Daubert.  In contrast to the effect of 
exclusion on prosecution experts, who often work for the 
government, exclusion of academics’ testimony will not necessarily 
work any change in research agenda, since neither the reputation 
nor the livelihood of these professional scholars depends on the 
courtroom.54 
DAUBERT’S POTENTIAL DAMAGE TO THE SYSTEM 
These observations lead to the following question, which gets at 
the third and final proposition I want to address: Assuming Daubert 
has the differential impact on prosecution and defense expertise just 
described, is it something we should worry about, or is it merely a 
sensible consequence of focusing criminal cases on reliability?  My 
answer is that we should worry, because Daubert’s reliability test, if it 
does lead to significant exclusion of defense evidence, will make the 
system both less fair and less reliable. 
As many commentators have pointed out, Daubertian reliability 
is not the only objective of the criminal justice system.  I have written 
about the defendant’s entitlement to voice, derived in the first 
instance from the Court’s due process jurisprudence establishing the 
right to testify,55 but also from the idea that the criminal justice 
system’s legitimacy is undermined when courts squelch the 
defendant’s efforts to tell his or her story, however tenuous.56  
Professor Sanders, in his article for this Symposium, similarly alludes 
to the procedural justice literature, which suggests that an important 
component of adjudication, from society’s as well as the individual’s 
 
$5 million to researchers investigating issues connected with insanity, confessions, 
and eyewitnesses (the latter broadly construed to include issues concerning memory, 
optimum identification procedures, and the ability of children to testify). See Nat’l 
Sci. Found., FastLane, available at http://www.fastlane.nsf.gov/a6/A6AwardSearch. 
htm (results on file with author) (using keywords “eyewitness & identification,” 
“confessions” and “insanity”).  Compare this figure to the more than $12 million the 
federal government appropriated in one year for various forensic identification 
research projects.  See Homeyer, supra note 50. 
 54 This fact, together with the fact that defense attorneys are typically not “repeat 
players” for these types of expertise, may mean that the hope that strict admissibility 
standards will trigger different research will not be borne out in this context.  Cf. 
David L. Faigman, The Evidentiary Status of Social Science under Daubert: Is It “Scientific,” 
“Technical,” or “Other” Knowledge?, 1 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 960, 971-77 (1995) 
(arguing that proper application of Daubert will stimulate better research). 
 55 Christopher Slobogin, The Admissibility of Behavioral Science Information in 
Criminal Trials: From Primitivism to Daubert to Voice, 5 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 100, 
113-17 (1999). 
 56 Id. at 117-19. 
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perspective, is the perception that people have an opportunity to 
make their point of view known.57  Professor Goldwasser has argued 
that reliability-based exclusionary rules, when used against the 
defendant, impair the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial.  That 
right, she notes, is “founded on the notion that juries are likely to be 
more protective of an accused than are judges”58  because, as a diverse 
group of laypeople, they will more likely “be receptive to—or at least 
give meaningful consideration to—the unusual, unexpected, or even 
implausible stories criminal defendants sometimes bring to court.”59  
And Professor Hoeffel has forcefully contended that the Sixth 
Amendment Compulsory Process Clause has been and should be 
read to accord the criminal defendant the right to present all 
material evidence.60  To interpret Daubert to require something more 
than materiality, she contends, undermines the fair process goals of 
rationality, predictability, and consistency, as judges futilely try to 
implement an amorphous reliability threshold in a wide array of 
contexts.61 
I will not rehearse these arguments any further here.  They all 
suggest that, whatever might be the case in the civil context out of 
which the Daubert trilogy arose, in the criminal setting concerns about 
process should trump concerns about reliability.  But it should also 
be recognized that reliability is not necessarily sacrificed when the 
defense is permitted to use evidence that fails the positivist threshold 
dictated by Daubert.  There are at least three reasons for thinking so. 
I have already suggested the first reason.  When the expertise 
addresses inferences about past mental state, we cannot know whether 
the opinion is reliable in the Daubertian sense, and thus exclusion 
may work a real harm to accuracy goals.  As one court has stated, 
“[l]egal tests of criminal insanity are not and cannot be the result of 
scientific analysis or objective judgment.”62  The same might be said 
about whether a person premeditated a crime or perceived a threat 
 
 57 Joseph Sanders, The Merits of the Paternalistic Justification for Restrictions on the 
Admissibility of Expert Evidence, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 881 (2003). 
 58 Katherine Goldwasser, Vindicating the Right to Trial by Jury and the Requirement of 
Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: A Critique of the Conventional Wisdom About Excluding 
Defense Evidence, 86 GEO. L.J. 621, 636 (1998). 
 59 Id. at 639. 
 60 Hoeffel, supra note 41, at 1352. 
 61 Id. at 1316-52 (using court decisions involving eyewitness, false confession, rape 
trauma syndrome, and polygraph expertise as a basis for arguing that courts apply 
Daubert inconsistently, and often with little attention to reliability concerns). 
 62 Holloway v. United States, 148 F.2d 665, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1945).  The court 
continued, “There is no objective standard by which such a judgment of an 
admittedly abnormal offender can be measured.”  Id. 
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and believed the force used was necessary to combat it.63  Aside from 
the malingerer (who can often be detected64), defendants who say 
they suffered mental aberrations during the offense may well be 
“right;” at least we have no scientific way of proving them wrong. 
For this reason, the suggestion that expert opinion testimony 
about mental state should be excluded unless it can be shown to be 
“reliable” in the social science sense (i.e., consistent over evaluators) 
would be inappropriate.65  While disagreement between two 
evaluators assessing the same individual does mean that one is wrong, 
it does not mean that both are wrong.  Because we cannot tell which 
evaluator’s opinion is invalid simply from comparison data, and 
because exclusion would deprive the defendant of voice, we should 
err on the side of letting the testimony in.  (At the same time, in an 
effort to improve consistency, we can insist on assessment techniques 
that consider, in a structured way, the legally relevant variables.66) 
The second reason the admission of “unscientific” evidence may 
not undermine ultimate “reliability” (now returning to use of that 
term to mean valid or accurate) relates to the typical heuristics of 
legal decision makers.  In cases where the defense makes claims 
based on past mental state, false confessions, or mistaken 
identification, the defendant is left with very little ammunition for 
creating reasonable doubt if he or she is deprived of an expert.  In 
these cases the defendant is trying to overcome assumptions, legal or 
otherwise, that are quite strong: that people who commit criminal 
acts intend their actions, control them, and do not grossly 
 
 63 See Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 64, 87 (D.C. 1976) (“The concept of mens 
rea involves what is ultimately the fiction of determining the actual thoughts or 
mental processes of the accused.  It is obvious that a certain resolution of this issue is 
beyond the ken of scientist and laymen alike.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 64 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 238-40 (1994) 
(stating that advances in detection of malingering can discern faking in over 90% of 
the cases when it does occur). 
 65 This proposition was put forward by David Faigman at this Symposium.  
Actually, reliability studies have shown fairly good inter-rater agreement between 
clinicians when gross dysfunction is the issue.  See GARY B. MELTON ET AL., 
PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH 
PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 229-31 (2d ed. 1997) (summarizing studies that find 
agreement rates on the issue of “insanity” of 64% to 97% between mental health 
professionals and of 88% to 93% between mental health professionals and courts); 
see also RICHARD ROGERS, R-CRAS MANUAL 13 (1984) (showing inter-rater agreement 
of 87% for “loss of cognitive control” and 89% for “loss of behavioral control”). 
Agreement on other types of issues is much lower, however.  See Doubts About 
Daubert, supra note 26, at 920-21. 
 66 I develop this last point in Christopher Slobogin, Pragmatic Forensic Psychology: A 
Means of “Scientizing” Expert Testimony from Mental Health Professionals? 9 PSYCHOL. PUB. 
POL’Y. & L. 275 (2003) [hereinafter Slobogin, Scientizing Expert Testimony]. 
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misperceive the surrounding circumstances; that people who are 
innocent do not confess to crimes; and that eyewitnesses who are sure 
about their identification do not get it wrong.  Expert testimony 
provides the decision maker with plausible reasons for challenging 
those assumptions.  Without the testimony, decisions are very likely to 
be uninformed.  Alternative explanations will never be heard, or will 
never be considered because they are supported only by the 
presumably self-serving statements of the defendant and the attorney. 
The result could be truly unreliable decisions, not just with 
respect to past mental state, the indeterminacy of which has already 
been noted, but also in connection with false confession and 
mistaken identification claims.  It is well to remember that mistaken 
identifications are the single most significant cause of wrongful 
convictions,67 and that coerced confessions are not too far behind in 
that category.68  Furthermore, articulate defense experts can help 
make up for the woefully inadequate representation often accorded 
defendants, another cause of wrongful convictions.69  Routine 
exclusion of defense expertise could also have more subtle effects on 
the accuracy of criminal adjudications: Knowing that their 
interrogation and identification processes will not be meaningfully 
challenged, prosecutors and police may be less careful in their 
investigation, producing further risk of erroneous verdicts.70 
The final reason evidence that fails Daubert should not be of 
tremendous concern in the criminal defense context is that criminal 
judges and juries know what to do with it.  As Professor Nance notes 
 
 67 BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER 
DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000) (finding that eyewitness 
identifications were involved in 84% of 63 definitive DNA-based exoneration cases in 
the United States); Arye Rattner, Convicted but Innocent: Wrongful Conviction and the 
Criminal Justice System, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 283, 289-91 (1988) (stating that out of 
205 erroneous conviction cases, eyewitness misidentifications were responsible for 
48.8%, a greater proportion than all other causes, including perjury (26%), coerced 
confessions (16%), and forensic science errors (3%)). 
 68 See Leo & Ofshe, supra note 36 (describing 60 cases in which they claimed false 
confessions were obtained); Rattner, supra note 67, at 290 (finding coerced 
confessions responsible for 16% of erroneous convictions). 
 69 OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY JURIES, 
EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASES STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH 
INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL 15-18 (1996) (describing wrongful convictions attributable to 
ineffective counsel). 
 70 Cf. Ellen Yankiver Suni, Who Stole the Cookie from the Cookie Jar?: The Law and 
Ethics of Shifting Blame in Criminal Cases, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1643, 1690 (2000) (“If 
police and prosecutors know that defendants have limited resources to investigate . . 
., and that even if defendants obtain resources to do so, evidence that they find will 
be unusable . . ., police and prosecutors will have little incentive to explore 
alternative theories once they have reached a preliminary conclusion.”) 
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in this Symposium, jurors are not credulous.71  The research that 
Professor Sanders believes calls for a paternalist stance toward jurors 
at best suggests that they are confused by “complex” expertise 
involving statistics;72 that type of testimony is rarely presented by the 
defense in criminal cases.  Professor Sanders also presents evidence 
suggesting that jurors engage in peripheral, rather than central, 
processing, even in non-complex cases.73  Even if that is so, it is not 
clear that adjusting expert admissibility standards is the appropriate 
response.  Arguably, the proper prescription for any lay tendency to 
pay too much attention to demeanor, amount of fee, credentials, and 
other “non-central” factors is not a reliability threshold—even 
reliable evidence will be ignored under the appropriate peripheral 
conditions—but rather presentation of expert evidence in as bland a 
manner as possible, perhaps through documents without identifying 
the source.  That, for better or worse, runs afoul of our adversarial 
tradition in criminal cases.74 
Most research shows that juries do not attribute undue 
significance to syndrome testimony, eyewitness testimony and the 
like; if anything, such testimony is undervalued because of a pervasive 
skepticism about social science claims.75  The one study described by 
Sanders that found to the contrary involved prediction testimony by a 
prosecution witness, which even strong cross-examination and an 
opposing expert could not shake.76  That study does not suggest that 
 
 71 Dale A. Nance, Reliability and the Admissibility of Experts, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 
191, 228 (2003). 
 72 Sanders, supra note 57, at 901-07. 
 73 Id. at 909-16. 
 74 Trial by document is prohibited by the Sixth Amendment’s right of 
confrontation clause.  See, e.g., Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988) (requiring face-to-
face meeting with available witnesses). 
 75 A meta-review of jury research in “non-scientific” cases summarized the 
findings this way: “It is clear that expert testimony is not accepted in a mindless 
fashion by gullible jurors awed by flashy credentials.  Rather, expert testimony is 
scrutinized as intensively as the testimony of any other witness and even viewed 
somewhat cynically.”  Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical 
Research on Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 622, 689 (2001); see also, 
Charles Bleil, Evidence of Syndromes: No Need for a “Better Mousetrap,” 32 S. TEX. L. REV. 
37, 66 (1990) (arguing that social science testimony is probably “the least over-awing” 
of the various types of expert testimony “because jurors have some innate knowledge 
of human behavior”); Neil J. Vidmar & Regina A. Schuller, Juries and Expert Evidence: 
Social Framework Testimony, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 133, 173 (1989) (reporting 
research indicating that jurors do not treat expert testimony on battered woman 
syndrome, rape trauma syndrome and eyewitness reliability with an unwarranted 
aura of accuracy). 
 76 Sanders, supra note 57, at 931-36 (describing Shari Seidman Diamond et al., 
Juror Reactions to Attorneys at Trial, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 17 (1996)). 
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defense witnesses need to be kept from the jury, but rather supports 
the point made earlier that the state naturally benefits from 
assumptions against defendants, so much so that defense evidence 
rarely dents its case.77  That is all the more reason to put as few 
obstacles in the way of defense efforts to do so, if reliability of 
outcome is really our ultimate goal. 
In sum, admission of expert testimony on past mental state, 
eyewitnesses, and interrogation will probably enhance reliability, even 
if that testimony is of questionable validity or fit.  Occasionally, a 
person who commits a serious crime will be erroneously acquitted 
because a jury, misled by expert testimony, mistakenly disbelieves a 
confession or an eyewitness, or mistakenly sympathizes with a 
psychopath asserting an insanity or diminished responsibility defense.  
But note first that, in the latter cases, a win for the defense will still 
usually result in incarceration, either in a hospital or prison.78  
Second, and most importantly, the small number of cases in which a 
guilty person actually walks free because of “unreliable” defense 
expertise will probably fall far below the number of cases in which it 
saves an innocent person.  In scientific terms, the number of false 
positives such testimony prevents is likely to be greater than the 
number of false negatives it causes.79  If so, the reasonable doubt 
standard strongly suggests that the experts should be allowed to 
testify. 
CONCLUSION 
Daubert and Kumho Tire, construed so as to require strong 
verifiability and vigorous fit to the task at hand, will exacerbate the 
imbalance between prosecution and defense that already exists.  
Once it has adjusted to the more stringent standards, the state, with 
its superior resources, its institutional incentives, and its focus on 
 
 77 Only when the government expert himself admitted he might be wrong two 
out of three times did study subjects tend to change their minds. Diamond et al., 
supra note 76, at Table 4.  The authors of the study themselves suggest that the 
outcome they obtained was due to the concordance between the expert’s views and 
the jurors preconceptions.  Id. at 53. 
 78 Typically, people found not guilty by reason of insanity are hospitalized for at 
least as long as those convicted of similar crimes spend in prison.  See MELTON ET AL., 
supra note 65, at 188-89.  Successful diminished responsibility defenses result in 
conviction on the lesser included offense.  Id. at 204-08. 
 79 Cf. R. Erik Lillquist, A Comment on the Admissibility of Forensic Evidence, 33 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 1189 (2003) (arguing that differential standards that increase the 
possibility of acquitting innocent defendants but that also increase the possibility of 
acquitting guilty defendants is a bad tradeoff because there are so many more guilty 
defendants). 
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expertise that relies on observance of physical facts, will have no 
problem producing admissible evidence, especially if the main 
admissibility criterion is the existence of error rates, rather than the 
existence of low ones.  The defense, on the other hand, will struggle 
to produce positivist-oriented expertise with sufficient external 
validity because of the socially constructed nature of its claims, the 
difficulty of simulating relevant scenarios, and the general 
disorganization of the defense bar.  The result will be a criminal 
process that is unfair in appearance and in fact, and one that will 
produce more unreliable results than one that is more generous 
toward defense-produced expertise. 
These considerations suggest that very few limitations should be 
placed on defense expertise.  There are at least three versions of a 
relaxed reliability standard.  Borrowing from the Supreme Court’s 
language in Rock v. Arkansas,80 Professor Hoeffel would admit defense 
expert evidence unless it is completely untrustworthy or is immune to 
the traditional means of evaluating credibility, such as cross-
examination, rebuttal witnesses, and jury instructions (in other 
words, she prefers the relevance test of yore).81  I have suggested a 
somewhat more demanding standard than Hoeffel’s, requiring that 
when the defense expert relies on theory that has not been subjected 
to verification it should at least be considered plausible among the 
relevant professionals, and that when an expert renders an opinion 
about a particular individual’s mental state, he or she should use 
accepted evaluation protocols.82  Also more demanding is the 
standard proposed by Professor Nance, who would generally permit 
any relevant expert evidence, but not if more reliable evidence is 
“reasonably” available, a standard he believes is necessary to 
encourage further, better research.83 
Each proposal can be attacked, even if we assume a relaxed 
approach is advisable.  Hoeffel’s test will strike some as a non-
standard; it might exclude astrology as completely untrustworthy, but 
 
 80 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987). 
 81 Hoeffel, supra note 41, at 1352. 
 82 Unfortunately, this standard can only be gleaned by looking at a number of my 
writings.  Slobogin, Doubts about Daubert, supra note 26, at 944-47; Slobogin, 
Psychiatric Evidence in Criminal Trials, supra note 26, at 41; Slobogin, Scientizing Expert 
Testimony, supra note 65, at 302-06.  The second article also makes a distinction 
between past mental state evidence and evidence designed to show an act did (or did 
not) occur.  The latter evidence, I argued, should only be admissible if it meets a 
Daubertian verifiability standard, whether presented by the prosecution or the 
defense.  Thus, eyewitness testimony would have to meet the latter standard, which I 
think it does.  See supra note 45. 
 83 Nance, supra note 71, at 228-30. 
  
2003 STRUCTURE OF EXPERTISE 125 
it would let in virtually all defense testimony from behavioral 
scientists, regardless of how “soft” it is.  My proposal suffers from the 
same problems that afflict Frye’s general acceptance test.84  It can be 
difficult determining how many professionals, in what field, have to 
accept a theory or protocol, as well as precisely what has to be 
accepted as plausible, and to what extent.  Nance’s willingness to 
exclude evidence when more reliable evidence is “reasonably 
available” presents similar problems.  Determining relative reliability, 
especially with respect to past mental state expertise, can be quite 
difficult.85  Moreover, better evidence is always possible to generate, at 
least in theory, and thus could be said to be “available,” yet, for 
reasons suggested earlier, the defense bar is ill-equipped 
institutionally to carry it out, making a determination of when such 
research might be “reasonably” available a guessing game.  Perhaps 
Hoeffel’s standard, if modified to permit exclusion when better 
research or protocols clearly already exist, best blends the notions 
underlying all three proposals, while retaining clarity.  Whatever the 
standard, it should ensure that defense expertise is not subject to a 
rigorous Daubert test. 
Again, it would not be inconsistent with this position to require 
that identification expertise offered by the prosecution satisfy the 
latter test.86  For reasons already described, prosecution expert 
 
 84 See generally Giannelli, supra note 7, at 1208-23. 
 85 Consider recent debates over whether testimony about past mental state based 
on the results of the Rorschach test is as “reliable” as other approaches.  See Barry 
Ritzler et al., Protecting the Integrity of Rorschach Expert Witnesses: A Reply to Grove and 
Barden (1999) Re: The Admissibility of Testimony Under Daubert/Kumho Analyses, 8 
PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 201 (2002); see also William M. Grove et al., Failure of 
Rorschach-Comprehensive-System-Based Testimony to be Admissible Under the Daubert-Joiner-
Kumho Standard, 8 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 216 (2002); Barry Ritzler et al., A Final 
Reply to Grove and Barden, 8 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 235 (2002).  See generally Edward 
J. Imwinkelreid, The Relativity of Reliability, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 269 (2003) 
(arguing that, under Nance’s approach, “the lack of a definition of reliability is a 
major flaw in the proposal” and that “administration of this rule during a jury trial 
will necessitate either horrendously long sidebar conferences or prolonged 
recesses”). 
 86 Professor Park argues that an “asymmetrical” approach to Daubert would create 
dissonance outside the courtroom (because the public will not be able to understand 
why the defense can use evidence the prosecution cannot) as well as inside the 
courtroom (because, if the defendant decides to use particular questionable types of 
evidence, it can be difficult figuring out how much the prosecution may respond in 
kind).  Park, supra note 52, at 1116-17.  He also suggests that loosened evidentiary 
standards will come back to haunt the defense because the system will make up for 
this advantage by shifting burdens, enhancing penalties and so on.  Id. at 1123.  The 
regime that I advocate would not be directly asymmetrical, in that the government, as 
well as the defense, would be the beneficiary of laxer reliability and fit rules when the 
expert testimony concerns past mental state, eyewitness, and confession testimony; 
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evidence tends to be easier to verify, better funded, less favored 
under constitutional doctrine, more prone to feed jury 
preconceptions, and more likely to cause dramatic harm if 
erroneous.  Daubert, a decision meant to make adjudication more 
reliable, will not do so if reliability is the only factor courts consider 
in making admissibility decisions.  Structural differences between 
criminal defense expertise and other types of expertise dictate that 
Daubert be read flexibly. 
 
 
only forensic identification and similar types of government expertise would be 
subject to stricter standards.  In this regime, Park’s concerns may dissipate.  To the 
extent they do not, they are no different than the concerns that are routinely 
associated with constitutionally-mandated adversarial advantages, ranging from the 
exclusion of evidence to the reasonable doubt standard itself.  Presumably Professor 
Park would not eliminate these latter advantages simply because the public may not 
understand them, courts have trouble implementing them, or the system adjusts in 
various ways to their impact.  These types of speculative harms do not outweigh the 
clear harm that would occur if, because of a rigid application of Daubert, criminal 
defendants are no longer able to tell their exculpatory or mitigating stories through 
experts. 
